Kepatuhan Pemerintah Daerah terhadap Mandatory Spending 20% Anggaran Pendidikan dalam APBD: Analisis 38 Provinsi Tahun Anggaran 2024

Abstract

Background: Indonesia's Constitution (Article 31(4)) and the National Education System Law require at least 20% of national and regional budgets to be allocated to education. Regional compliance has mostly been studied normatively or through single-region case studies, and rarely mapped quantitatively across all provinces together with fiscal correlates. Objective: To map compliance of Indonesia's 38 provincial governments with the 20% threshold in the 2024 budgets (APBD), quantify the shortfall in non-compliant provinces, and examine how compliance relates to fiscal autonomy, transfer dependence, and personnel spending. Methods: Descriptive cross-sectional quantitative study. Provincial ratios of education-affairs budgets to total regional expenditure (Ministry of Home Affairs data as of July 2024) were taken from a 2024 Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) study and checked for internal consistency. Fiscal variables (own-source revenue, transfers, personnel spending, total expenditure) were taken from the Ministry of Finance's DJPK regional budget portal. Analyses used descriptive statistics, Fisher's exact test, Mann–Whitney tests, Spearman correlations, OLS with HC3 standard errors, and a denominator sensitivity check. Results: Twenty-eight provinces (73.7%) met the 20% threshold and ten did not. The median ratio was 26.08% (range 3.59–42.37%), and the pooled ratio across provinces was 25.20%. Non-compliance was concentrated entirely in the six Papuan provinces (median 7.98%) and four of the five Kalimantan provinces (group median 17.21%); all 27 other provinces complied (Fisher p < 0.001). The ten provinces were jointly IDR 3.88 trillion short of 20%. Fiscal autonomy correlated positively with the ratio (ρ = 0.35; p = 0.032), but the association disappeared once the Papuan group was excluded or controlled for. The education ratio correlated strongly with the personnel share of total spending (ρ = 0.76; p < 0.001). Compliance status was unchanged when the denominator was replaced with final budget totals reported by DJPK. Conclusion: Provincial non-compliance is not widespread but concentrated in two institutional settings: newly created Papuan provinces that do not yet carry education personnel costs, and resource-rich Kalimantan provinces with large total budgets. Elsewhere, compliance rests largely on teacher salaries, so numerical compliance does not necessarily indicate the quality of education spending.